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Abstract: 
This paper explores the returns to managerial ability and his role in determining efficiency in Argentina 
dairy farms. Using an unbalanced panel data from 2003 through 2009 we estimate production frontiers 
and technical efficiency effects. Most studies analyzing the impact of human capital in agriculture use the 
measure of years of schooling of the producer as a proxy for decision-making skills. An alternative measure 
is used in this paper. The measure was derived by “grading” decision-making and execution skills of the 
farmers. Grades were assigned by farm advisors knowledgeable of each farm and producer characteristics. 
Assigned grades were then used in the production frontiers as inputs to estimate the impact of management 
skills on firm-level results. A very significant impact of these skills on firm results and on technical efficiency 
and was found.  
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New technologies, changes in relative prices and changes in the factor and output markets 
faced by farmers have resulted in a substantial increase in the demand for decision-
making skills. As pointed out by Schultz (1975) these skills can be considered an “ability 
to deal with disequilibrium”. It is these changes (disequilibrium conditions) that place a 
premium on transforming data and other signals into useful information, and this 
information into purposive, goal-oriented action.  Variation in managerial skills will give 
rise to variation in firm-level outcomes.  
Research carried out since the early 1970´ has shown that farmer education is an 
important variable explaining input use (Huffman, 1977), firm efficiency (Fane, 1975), 
off-farm labor allocation (Huffman, 1980) and other aspects. Farmer education is seen as 
particularly critical in low-income countries where a large portion of total population is 
employed in agriculture, educational levels are low, and new technologies place 
considerable demands on production management. Studies analyzing the impact of 
human capital on production efficiency have distinguished between a “worker” and an 
“allocative” effect (Welch, 1970).  The former relates to education allowing more output 
to be obtained with the same input level. In turn, the latter results from improved decision-
making abilities allowing adaptation to change. More recent studies have in general 
confirmed and extended previous results (for a summary see Huffman 2000). 
Years of formal education are only a proxy for the farmer´s ability as a manager. 
In particular, learning-by-doing, participation in farmer groups, community networks and 
extension services can all complement or substitute the farmer´s educational level in 
generating decision-making outcomes. Herbert Simon and colleagues (March and Simon, 
1958) pointed out several decades ago that the “logic of consequences” (“rational” 
appraisal of alternatives) may be of less importance than the “logic of appropriateness” 
whereby courses of action are recalled from rules of thumb that were helpful in previous 
instances. More recently, Vernon Smith (2008) argues that “ecological” rationality 
(rationality resulting from situation-specific adaptive behavior) may be more useful than 
“constructivist” rationality, where actions are chosen on the base of some type of means-





The above points out that learning-by-doing and “on-hands” experience may 
explain an important part of productivity differences between firms. The concept of 
“human capital” should then include not only formal “classroom” learning, but other 
forms of knowledge uptake as well. This is particularly important when attempting to 
explain differences in performance of medium or large-sized farms, where most if not all 
entrepreneurs have completed high school, many of which have also attended the 
university. For these farmers differences in “managerial human capital” may have more 
to do with aspects such as previous experience, the “need for achievement”, overall 
managerial approach and other factors, than differences in the formal level of education 
attained.  
Nuthall (2009) uses micro-level data to test the hypothesis that previous 
experience, “management style”, personal objectives and other factors affect managerial 
ability. The point made is that in some situations differences in “decision quality” are not 
primarily a function of differences in formal schooling (as for medium/large farms these 
differences are small or nonexistent) but of a set of variables reflecting hands-on 
experience, individual objectives and other aspects. Heterogeneity is thus an important 
characteristic to be taken into account when analyzing performance of farm firms.  
In a recent paper Byma and Tauer (2010) explores the role of managerial ability 
in explaining efficiency in a group of New York dairy farms using stochastic distance 
frontier functions. The main hypothesis of the paper is whether inefficiency is due to 
measures of managerial ability, a possible missing input in efficiency measurement. They 
use lagged net farm income and farmers’ own estimates of the value of their labor and 
management as proxies for managerial ability, finding significant positive impacts on 
efficiency.  Efficiency also increases with operator education, farm size, and extended 
participation in a farm management program. 
 This paper has the objective of estimating the impact of managerial ability on 
production efficiency and firm results. Managerial ability is not measured here by years 
of schooling as is common in most human-capital studies in agriculture but by third-party 
assessment of how management carries out tasks. Task performance – the direct result of 
managerial action – is then a basic input into the production process. This input´s 
productivity is analyzed here.   
 Assessment of each farm´s managerial “quality” was made by the farm´s 
professional advisor. These assessments were used to predict the impact, on farm 





The paper attempts to quantify the value of efforts aimed at improving overall 
managerial effectiveness. Effectiveness scores used here are thus not derived from 
“input” measures such as years of schooling, but from direct observation of managerial 
behavior on a day-to-day basis.  The existence of a positive relation between (subjective) 
managerial effectiveness scores and “objective” firm outcomes – if confirmed – has 
several implications. First, selected decision-making skills can be linked to observed firm 
performance. This can allow improved tailoring of educational and extension programs 
to farm-level demands. Second, the fact that effectiveness scores are derived from 
(subjective) farm advisor diagnosis suggests that advisors themselves have valuable 
knowledge on the determinants of production efficiency. How this knowledge is 
translated into improved performance is an issue worth attending. 
 The hypothesis to be tested is that managerial ability measures have predictive 
value in explaining farm output. This hypothesis is non-trivial, as the possibility exists 
that “grades” (managerial effectiveness scores) assigned to managers will not be related, 
or be only weakly related, to production efficiency. For example, advisors may be 
“production oriented”, placing emphasis on increased input use and output maximization, 
and not necessarily on efficiency per-se. Production specialists may also in some cases 
overrate the impact of certain “fashionable” practices, and underrate producers who 
choose more modest but equally efficient approaches.  
It is also possible that in the group of farms analyzed here the role of the private 
advisor is be more of a “facilitating” (networking, information transfer) than pure 
“consulting” type – i.e. the advisor does necessarily “know more” than his client, his role 
being in helping his client in exploring production and management alternatives.1 If this 
is the case, advisor assessment of managerial quality will not necessarily be correlated 
with differences in firm performance. Indeed, only if “knowledge gaps” exist between 
farm advisors and what is done at the farm level (advisors having identified problems or 
opportunities not identified, or not acted upon by farm owners) will advisor evaluations 
signal performance differences among farms.  
 
Managerial know-how and farm efficiency 
 
                                                          
1 Farms advisors may play other roles as well. For example, in farms where partial or total separation 
exists between management and control, advisors may act as production and management (informal) 





Monitoring input contribution and allocating rewards and punishments is a basic 
managerial function (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This function is carried out directly 
by owners in owner-controlled firms or by professional managers in firms where 
ownership is separated from day-to-day control. In these “corporate” firms additional 
delegation problems emerge.  
 The standard production function approach abstracts the monitoring and 
management function as described above, and managerial ability is a “missing variable” 
in most of the econometric specifications. Broad categories of inputs are combined in 
order to produce certain output. In a real-world firm, of course, many different sub-
production processes take place simultaneously or in sequence. The efficiency with which 
inputs are transformed into intermediate and final outputs depends on how well these 
numerous sub-production processes are carried out. For example, in a dairy farm the 
efficiency with which pastures or concentrates are transformed into milk depends on a 
number of day-to-day decisions. Similarly, effective labor management practices may 
allow result in more “effort” to be obtained from a same amount of nominal labor-hours. 
Leadership skills, in particular, may be important for teamwork to develop. The 
effectiveness of the  Alchian and Demsetz  “monitor” may well vary among firms.  
 The extent to which managerial skills are applied in the production process may 
be gauged by knowledgeable observers. Extension workers, farm advisors, consultants as 
well as successful farmers may all be capable of “grading” application of management 
know-how in a given farm. The degree to which the assigned “grade” predicts production 
efficiency will of course depend on several factors. Of these, the skill of the observer and 
the frequency with which the graded farm is visited by this observer appear to be 
particularly important. Assigning “grades” to managers on the basis of observation of on-
farm practices is conceptually no different from assigning grades to students in the sense 
that assigned grades may or may not be correlated with the underlying output of interest 
-- production efficiency in the case of a farm, “labor market success” or other outcomes 
in the case of a student. 
 The above raises the question of the reason behind the “performance gap” existing 
between “how well things are carried out” and “how well they could be carried out”.  For 
example, why farmer A scores low on the item “pasture production and utilization” or on 
“attitude to change”.  In a conventional microeconomic framework, the only possible 
explanation for the “low score” is that changing this score to a higher one would not be 





for the score increase. For example, an older farmer may find the benefits of “changing 
his ways” small (he will retire in a few years) while the costs of doing so are “large” (he 
values his leisure highly).  
Alternative explanations may include aspects such as “satisficing” behavior 
(which in a sense is not at odds with the conventional approach once all relevant costs are 
taken into account), aversion to risk (or “change”) or other factors. Whichever is the case, 
both practitioners as well as research results (see e.g. Bravo-Ureta, 2002) point out that 
production efficiency in many firms is well below the maximum possible.  
 As a first approximation, the following two-way classification of managerial 
inputs is presented: 
 
 
1. Production management: this dimension focuses on “practical” aspects. For 
example, pasture and supplementary feed management, labor quality and 
supervision.  
 
2. Leadership and entrepreneurial function: includes “intangibles” such as focus on 
the business, general managerial know-how, leadership skills and attitude to 
change.  
 
Positive correlation is expected between items 1 and 2 above. However, informal 
evidence suggests that some managers may excel in some function but achieve modest 
results in another. In particular, “production-oriented” managers may focus attention on 
“nuts and bolts” aspects such as efficiency of the grazing system, or the throughput of the 
existing milking shed, and neglect “business” aspects such as the need for new 
investments or of renting additional land. Further, improving items 1 and 2 may require 
different approaches. In particular, practical demonstrations may be extremely useful in 
order to reduce (say) losses in administering silage to cattle; however “blackboard” 
instruction may be necessary is business planning or even leadership skills are to be 
improved.  
  
The Case Study 
 
We analyze firms belonging to the Argentine agricultural sector. Records of dairy farms 
were used to estimate the impact of managerial know-how on production. Data on output 





Argentine CREA (“Consorcios Regionales de Experimentación Agrícola”) groups. The 
CREA  movement started out in Argentina in the late 1950´s. It´s focus is to develop and 
help spread improved agronomic, livestock production and general management 
technologies at the farm level. CREA farms also carry out applied agricultural systems 
research. Some 200 groups of 10-12 farms each comprise the organization. Each of these 
groups hires a part-time professional advisor/facilitator and meets regularly (at least once 
a month) to discuss ways to improve efficiency. The advisor is not expected to deliver 
“consulting” services in the traditional sense but to facilitate learning and the transfer of 
information. CREA group members learn both from themselves as well as from other 
farmers. Comparative analysis of production records provides additional insights related 
to the possibility of improvements.  
 
























Centro 228 278 1351 4.3 2.1 370 
     
  
 
Este 262 373 1336 4.7 2.3 285 
     
  
 
Lit Sur 327 372 1149 2.9 2.3 237 
     
  
 
MyS 296 385 1409 5.5 2.2 219 
     
  
 
NOA 343 533 2203 9.8 2.4 170 
     
  
 
Oeste Aren 514 734 2828 9.5 4.8 267 
     
  
 
Oeste 299 390 1694 4.5 2.5 333 
     
  
 
Sfe C 134 205 665 2.7 1.2 333 
     
  
 
SSFe 804 1024 4717 10.3 7.0 315 
     
  
 
All 293 383 1517 4.7 2.4 300 
(*) Land rental value: average (estimated) rental value for the 2010 year 
 
CREA can be considered a privately-sponsored “agricultural extension” 





primarily by private-sector professionals. As shown in Figure 1, farm use of private 
advisors and consultants increases from some 30 - 40 percent for farms of less than 100 
hectares, to 80 percent in farms larger than 4000 hectares. In contrast, public-sector 
extension services reach less than 10 percent of farms of all size classes. The importance 
of privately employed professionals in information delivery suggests that these 
professionals are a significant source of know-how.  We address below the issue of the 
predictive value of this knowledge.  
 
 
 Each farms´ management “quality” was assessed by the farms´ advisor. Only one 
“management grade” was assigned per farm, independent of the number of years of 
records available for the farm (this assumes for the farm unchanging “management 
quality” through time). Some 200 farms were assessed. More than one year of data is 
available for most farms, resulting in a data base of 500 observations. Assessment 
includes items ranging from “practical” aspects such as grazing efficiency and the 
management of milking operation to more “general” variables such as leadership, 
business focus and adaptation to change. Following the discussion of the previous section, 
two management-quality indexes were derived from the questionnaire: (i) the Production 
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and LEI).  Both of these indexes are simple arithmetic averages of production- and 
“management” scores received by the farmer from his professional advisor: 
 
(1)𝑃𝑀𝐼𝑖 = 100 ∗ [𝑓𝑚𝑖 + 𝑠𝑓𝑚𝑖 + 𝑙𝑖]/15 
 
(2)𝐿𝐸𝐼𝑖 = 100 ∗ [𝑏𝑓𝑖 + 𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝑡𝑟𝑖 + 𝑐ℎ𝑖]/20 
 
 Where, for the i-th farm (management scores take integer values of 10 [bad], 20 
[deficient], 30  [good], 40 [very good] and 50 [excellent]): 
 
 
     fmi = forage management 
     sfmi = supplementary feed management 
      li = labor management/quality 
      bfi = business focus 
      lei = leadership 
      tri = managerial training 
                 chi = attitude to change 
 
 
Figure 2 shows the cumulative distribution function of both indexes. “Sparse-data” 
procedures (Anderson, Dillon and Hardaker, 1977 p. 40) were used to construct CDF´s. 
In a 0-100 scale the median value is approximately 65 for the PMI and 70 for the LEI (for 
both indexes the median values are somewhat higher than “good”).  A substantial portion 
(> 20 percent) of the sample has management indexes below 50; conversely 10 – 20 
percent of the sample has indexes above 80.  The variability of the LEI appears larger 
than that for the PMI. This opens the possibility of substantial improvements in overall 
efficiency by focusing educational programs on issues such as leadership, managerial 







Production Function and Technical Efficiency 
 
The following Cobb-Douglas function is used to estimate resource productivity and 
returns to improving managerial quality: 
 
 
















where:   
    yit = output (milk) 
    Hit = land (total land rental imputed value) 
    Cit = herd size (cows) 
    SFit = supplementary feed (tons grain equivalent) 
    Lit = labor (full-time equivalent years) 
    OEit = overhead expenses (pesos) 
    PMIt = production management index 
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First, we choose a conventional production function and the model presented in equation 
(3), where managerial inputs enter directly in the production process, is estimated by 
OLS.  Second, we estimate the same production function using stochastic frontier models. 
The inclusion of proxies for managerial inputs in a stochastic frontier implies that the 
estimated technical inefficiency effects captures other constraints on the use of know-
how, different from managerial ability. These constraints are considered as a random 
effect and modeled as a stochastic element of the production function.   
Table 1 describes the sample of farms. Most farms are located in the pradera 
pampeana (pampean prairie), a highly productive grain-livestock area. Average farm size 
is nearly 300 hectares, considerably (some 50-70 70 percent) larger than the average of 
dairy farms in the country. As mentioned previously, these farms belong to a farm-
management association, and as such can be expected to attain efficiency levels above 
those reached by the average dairy farm.  
As relates to managerial practices, 91 percent of farms are owner- managed, and 
in 44 percent of farms the manager engages in other activities besides managing his farm. 
In these farms labor inputs are not provided by the manager but by hired workers, overall 
“production” supervision being frequently carried out by a hired foreman, in some cases 
paid partially or totally by a piece-rate system. The manager then makes overall input 
allocation decisions, purchases inputs and negotiates output sales, maintains production 
and financial records.  
Estimation results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table 1, column 1 presents the 
basic OLS estimates. With the exception of overhead expenses all “conventional” input 
variables are significant (p=.01). “Managerial expertise” variable PMI is significant at p 
= .01, variable LEI are significant at p = .05. This indicates that advisor perceptions (or 
diagnosis) of management quality has predictive value. Partial elasticity of output with 
respect to the PMI (0.11) is higher than that of the LEI (0.08).  
 “Technical Efficiency” (TE) in this case is defined as the ratio “actual” to 
“potential” output. For the sample of farms analyzed here it can be computed using the 
estimated production function. “Potential” output is represented by that attained by the 
producers in the 90-percentile management level. Under these assumptions, median TE 











Table 2. Production Function (OLS) and Stochastic Frontier Estimates 
 1 2 3 
Variables Coeff t Coeff z Coeff z 
Constant -1.01 -5.22 *** -0.95 -5.19 *** -1.08 -5.25 *** 
H (land) 0.08 3.51 *** 0.09 4.33 *** 0.10 4.03***  
C (herd size) 0.59 17.91 *** 0.56 18.03 *** 0.59 18.65 *** 
SF (supplementary feed) 0.11 5.55 *** 0.11 6.32 *** 0.11 5.89 *** 
L (labor) 0.22 10.22 *** 0.22 10.80 *** 0.21 9.76 *** 
OE (overhead expenses) 0.01 0.71  0.01 1.01  0.008 0.89  
PMI (management index) 0.11 2.85 *** 0.11 2.69 *** 0.11 2.47 ** 
LEI (lidership index)  0.08 2.10 ** 0.08 2.35 ** 0.09 2.28**  
    0.033 9.387 *** 0.015 13.63 *** 
    0.615 8.473 *** 0.99 100 *** 
Adj. R2  0.96       
Observations 499 499 499 
Number of farms 180 180 180 
log likelihood 262.739 271.692 280.18 
LR Test    17.91 34.89 
Df    1 1 
Average Efficiency    0.90 0.93 




(Aigner et al 1977) 
Time Invariant 
Stochastic Frontier. 
Panel data (Battese 
and Coelli, 1988) 
  
Dummy variables not reported.   
(*), (**) , (***) significant at 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. 










Table 3. Stochastic Frontier Estimates 
 1 2 3 4 
Variables Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z Coeff z 
Constant -0.34 -1.72 * -1.01 4.86 *** -1.08 -5.12*** -0.91 -4.84*** 
H (land) 0.02 1.07  0.10 4.17 *** 0.11 4.86*** 0.091 4.19*** 
C (herd size) 0.74 23.51 *** 0.56 16.78 *** 0.56 19.16*** 0.56 19.08*** 
SF (supplementary feed) 0.08 4.29 *** 0.11 5.14 *** 0.12 7.03*** 0.11 6.63*** 
L (labor) 0.16 7.35 *** 0.23 10.15 *** 0.20 10.17*** 0.25 12.27*** 
OE (overhead expenses) 0.01 0.62  0.01 1.23  0.007 0.82 0.005 0.60 
PMI (management index) 0.08 1.74 * 0.06 1.23  0.10 2.26** 0.07 1.69* 
LEI (lidership index)  0.03 0.75  0.10 2.42 ** 0.08 2.12** 0.09 2.51** 
Trend    0.02 3.37 ***     
Inneficiency Effects-Col. 1           
Constant 7.24 4.24 ***        
PME -1.48 -5.09 ***        
LEI -0.95 -2.51 **        
 0.23 4.36 *** 0.32 3.64 *** 0.09 17.68*** 0.11 27.34*** 
 0.96 93.93 *** 0.95 68.15 ***     
    -0.80 -6.07 ***     
Observations 409 409 499 499 
Number of farms 180 180 180 180 
log likelihood 269.207 248.874 312.41 309.37 
LR Test 12.885 82.409   
Df 4 3   
Average Efficiency 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.92 
Avg. Efficiency year 2003    0.998 0.92 0.89 
Avg. Efficiency year 2004    0.997 0.94 0.94 
Avg. Efficiency year 2005    0.992 0.95 0.96 
Avg. Efficiency year 2006    0.985 0.94 0.96 
Avg. Efficiency year 2007    0.959 0.94 0.94 
Avg. Efficiency year 2008    0.915 0.92 0.90 
Avg. Efficiency year 2009    0.857 0.91 0.84 
Estimation Method 
Tech. Eff. Effects 
Stochastic 
Frontier. Panel 




















Dummy variables not reported.   
(*), (**) , (***) significant at 10%, 5% and 1%  respectively. 
LR test: One-sided Generalised Likelihood-Ratio Test.  
 
 Table 2, column 2 presents the results using a pooled data stochastic frontier 
(Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977) and column 3 the estimates of a panel data time 
invariant stochastic frontier (Battese and Coelli 1988). Table 3, column 1 presents the 
estimates of a technical efficiency effects stochastic frontier for panel data (Battese and 





and Coelli, 1992). Column 3 presents the True random-effects model (Greene, 2005) and 
column 4 the maximum likelihood random-effects flexible time-varying efficiency model 
(Kumbhakar, 1990).  
Comparing the OLS coefficient estimates and the deterministic estimation of 
technical efficiency with the estimates obtained using stochastic frontier models we 
observe that coefficient estimates for conventional inputs and managerial inputs are 
similar in terms of magnitude and significance. The average efficiency effects in 
stochastic models range from a maximum of 96 per cent to a minimum of 90 per cent. 
The estimate of coefficient in the stochastic frontier models suggests that an important 
part of the residual variation is due to the inefficiency effects (ui), and that the random 
error part (vi) is close to zero in models 3 and 4. Also, according to the one- sided 
generalized likelihood-ratio test of , the stochastic frontier models are preferred to the 
traditional average response function. Both results suggest that the stochastic frontier 
models are not significantly different from the deterministic frontier model with no 
random error included. 
Our estimates of production efficiency can be compared also to other similar 
studies, albeit with caution because of differences in the estimation procedures. For 
example, Bravo-Ureta (2002) provides a comprehensive summary of efficiency studies. 
In high-income countries (HIC) TE averages (all reported studies) range from a maximum 
of 97 to a minimum of 53 percent (average 80 percent). In turn, in low-income countries 
(LIC) TE ranges from 88 to 53 percent (average 74 percent).  
The study of Byma and Tauer (2010) on dairy farms also reports high technical 
efficiency levels of 0.91 and 0.92, and significant positive impacts of the managerial 
ability measures on efficiency. These findings support the hypothesis that measured 
inefficiency may be due to the missing managerial ability input and are consistent with 
our estimates. 
It is important to bear in mind that TE values found here result from a sample of 
farms most probably characterized by substantially higher managerial efficiency than the 
average farm of the country. Thus, these TE values overestimate “true” efficiency levels 







Managerial Ability and Output Change 
 
Production function results can be used to predict output change resulting from 
managerial improvement. Using the OLS estimates (traditional average response 
function), we assume here a change in the PMI and LEI from a “low” value of 50 to a 
“high” one of 80. These values approximately correspond to the 20 and 80 (for PMI) and 
90 (for LEI) percentiles in the management index distributions (see Figure 2). The 
improvement in managerial ability assumed here is therefore substantial. Table 4 shows 
predicted output increases for several production areas. Results are expressed in US$ and 
were calculated for median values of resource use in each of the reported areas.   
 If both PMI as well as LEI increase from the 20 to the 80/90 percentile level, 
predicted output will increase 9.4 percent (see Table 4).  In financial terms, output loss 
incurred by managers graded as “deficient” as compared to those graded “very 
good/excellent” varies from 150 to 180 US$ per hectare. In order to gauge the importance 
of these figures, a comparison can be made with average rental rates for land in the chosen 
production areas. As shown, these range from a minimum of US$ 170 in the sub-tropical 
“NOA” area to a maximum of US$ 370 in the “Centro” region. The output loss/land rent 
ratio varies from close to 1 for the NOA region, to 0.46 for the Centro region. These 
results are large: output losses (expressed on a per-hectare basis) can in some cases equal 
land rental rates.  
For the farms in the sample, output differences computed at median input use 
levels of the 20- as compared to the 80/90-percentile management index range from 
25.000 to more than 145.000 US$ per year. These disequilibrium levels are well above 
what would be needed (for example) for the hiring of full-time and high-quality 
managerial assistance. Disequilibrium in the use of managerial inputs appears to occur: 








Table 4. Impact of Improvement in the Production Management and Leadership Entrepreneurial 































228 327 343 134 514 299 804 262 296 





370 237 170 333 267 333 315 285 219 
           
  
Production Increase (US$/ha) 










3.7% 72.4 58.3 64.2 72.9 78.1 74.4 71.1 80.9 71.6 
(5) 
Improvement 
both PMI and 
LEI (US$/ha) 










42.2 48.8 56.4 25.0 102.6 56.9 146.3 53.0 53.0 
 
 One possible explanation for this divergence is that the PMI and LEI indexes may 
be correlated with unmeasured “input quality”: farms with (say) high PMI may not only 
have high-quality production management, but a higher-than average (and unmeasured in 
the production function specification) quality labor, herd, pastures or milking equipment. 
If this is the case, divergence between managerial input marginal productivity and input 
prices will be overestimated, as improvement in the managerial input is accompanied by 
increased in (non-managerial) inputs used, increases that are not captured in the estimated 
production function.  
Quality corrections are made on two of the included inputs: land and overhead 
expenses. In the case of land, the estimated rental rate was used to correct for different 
land qualities. Further, area-specific dummies capture additional land or location 
differentials.  The use of monetary values for the overhead expense input should take care 





are not quality-corrected, and if indeed quality of these is correlated with the managerial 
input indexes, biased estimation of marginal productivity of these will occur.  
 The issue of possible overestimation of the impact of improvement of managerial 
quality resulting from co-variation between managerial and (unobserved) non-managerial 
input quality certainly deserves additional attention. The question to be answered is what 
would the “correct” marginal productivities of PMI and LEI be if varying input quality 
would be taken into account not only for land and overhead expenses (as done here) but 
for labor, animal numbers and supplementary feed).  Account has to be taken, however, 
of the possibility that higher managerial quality may in some cases result in increases in 
input quality not necessarily through the purchase of more expensive inputs but through 
“more bang for the buck”. For example, better selection of cows, or of feed inputs results 
in “higher quality inputs”. If this is the case complex issues arise as increased input quality 
is one of the outputs of improved managerial performance.  
 While overestimation of marginal productivity of the PMI and LEI inputs is 
certainly possible, it should also be pointed out that only the “worker effect” impact of 
managerial ability is analyzed here (more output from a given input vector). The literature 
on human capital and production efficiency (see e.g. Huffman, 2000) points out that 
allocative effects could be of more importance than the direct worker effects. These 
allocative effects relate to improved input-level and output combination decisions in the 
face of changing relative prices.  
It should also be noted that the sum of elasticities of the “conventional” inputs in 
the OLS estimated production function (1.01) indicates constant returns to scale. 
However, if managerial ability (PMI and LEI indexes) increases proportionally the returns 
to scale parameter increases to 1.20. Higher-ability managers will thus be able to expand 
operations, while lower-ability managers will not find advantage in doing so. Welch, for 
example, points out to the complementarities existing between managerial ability and 
farm size (Welch, 1978).  
Lastly, in the sample of farms analyzed here managerial quality is probably higher 
than that found in average farms of the country. If this is indeed the case, at the country-
wide level the impact on production and economics results of improving different 









For the farms analyzed here, managerial ability appears to account for substantial 
differences in production efficiency. These differences could result in the gradual growth 
in size of “high managerial ability” farms, and the gradual retreat or even disappearance 
of farms where managerial ability is lower. Changes such as these are already occurring 
in Argentina and other countries. Findings also suggest that programs aimed at improving 
managerial performance could well have substantial payoffs.  
 In recent years considerable attention has been focused on the effectiveness of 
extension services and other types of services aimed at transferring know-how to 
agricultural producers. For example, Anderson and Feder (2003) report opportunities for 
information agricultural extension services, but also warn that in many (if not most) cases 
these services have had a relatively small impact on efficiency and farm profitability. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the literatures dealing with information-delivery systems (e.g. 
Andeson and Feder, 2003) and the one dealing with efficiency of production (e.g. Bravo-
Ureta, 2002) have followed different paths. However; these two strands of research are 
clearly related: farm-level differences in efficiency are a result of limitations with which 
management is carried out. Extension services are one of the ways in which these 
limitations can be overcome. 
 Relaxing managerial constraints calls for improved understanding on how 
managers acquire and then use information. The approach used here of having farm 
advisors “grade” management in a given farm, and then analyzing the importance of these 
“grades” in accounting for differences in farm efficiency can be used to estimate the 
impacts of publicly or privately-sponsored aimed at improving farm-level performance. 
The impact of these services can be considered a two-step “production process”: the one 
analyzed here maps subjectively evaluated management performance with firm-level 
results. The other link refers to the impact of knowledge-transfer programs on 
subjectively-evaluated managerial decision-making and execution skills.  
If this two-step production process is better understood, progress could be made on 
improved understanding of information-delivery and training projects aimed at 
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